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Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UKIn the 1960s, stories of children fighting cancer,
previously absent from the British news, started to
feature ever more prominently in the national press.
Conventional treatments could not keep children alive
for many months, so the promise of a cure through the
use of an alternative anti-cancer ‘serum’ was not easily
dismissed as quackery. The Ministry of Health and
cancer research organisations struggled to find a fair
and honest way to inform the public and affected
families about childhood leukaemia without raising or
crushing hope.Introduction
Shortly before Christmas 1963, the British public was
introduced to Edward Burke, a little boy from Blackpool
suffering from acute leukaemia. His only chance of life, it
seemed, was to travel overseas to receive an unorthodox
but promising treatment. The major British daily papers
followed his progress closely for four months, the first time
that a particular child suffering from cancer made the
national news. Leading cancer experts, senior officials at
the Medical Research Council (MRC), the Ministry of
Health, parliament and even the Queen found themselves
drawn into Edward’s case. His plight exposes changes in
journalistic practice, public interest in and understanding
of cancer at this time and illustrates the importance of a
small, patient-led charity in changing the perception of
childhood cancer in Britain forever.
In the 1960s, acute leukaemia was the most common
and dreaded of all the cancers affecting children, feared
because it was invariably and usually rapidly fatal. While
the American media had carried stories about families
touched by childhood cancer since at least the 1930s [1],
their British counterparts had been virtually silent on the
subject until the early 1960s. Then, from 1961 onwards,
children with cancer began to appear in the news with
increasing frequency, both as a patient category and, with
Edward, as individuals.
The sudden entry of such stories into the British press
cannot simply be explained by changes in the nature of
science journalism in the 1960s: the absence of all mention
of children with cancer until this period was deliberate and
negotiated. What catapulted paediatric cancer into the
spotlight at this time was a battle betweenmedical institu-
tions over the ‘right’ way to talk to the public about such aCorresponding author: Barnes, E. (emm.barnes@manchester.ac.uk).
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cine to meet the needs of those affected.
Edward’s tale
In the latter part of 1963, doctors in Edward Burke’s
hometown of Blackpool diagnosed him with acute leukae-
mia but could offer no treatment. Edward’s parents, mean-
while, had heard of Gaston Naessens, a French biologist
claiming to have a cure for all manner of cancers (Figure 1).
Although the French medical authorities had serious con-
cerns about his credentials – he had no recognised diploma
in science and had faced trial for practicing medicine with-
out a licence [2] – the Burke family began raising money to
transfer their son to France and into his care.
Naessens named his treatment ‘Anablast’ (meaning
‘without cancer cells’), an antibody-based serum produced
by immunizing a horse with cells from a patient suffering
from cancer. When Naessens accepted Edward as a
patient, the chemist came under scrutiny like never before
as French government laboratories prepared to put Ana-
blast to the test.
Until it had investigated the safety and efficacy of this
treatment, the government announced that no doctor
should administer it to their patients, and as Naessens
had refused to pay for such tests, he had relocated to
Corsica where French law held less authority and was
harder to apply. Even then, unwilling to face trial again
should he administer the serum himself, he struggled to
find a doctor prepared to work alongside him. William
Snook, the British Vice-Consul in Corsica who had
arranged for Edward to fly out with his mother on 22
December 1963, soon announced that unless a doctor could
be found quickly the pair would have to return to the
United Kingdom to avoid Edward’s health deteriorating
further.
That evening, 3000 Corsicans staged a rally in Bastia
where the boy was staying to show their sympathy for
Edward’s plight, bearing placards with slogans that read
‘Quickly, leukaemia does not wait’, and ‘We must save
Eddie’. The French government grew alarmed at the scale
of the publicity Naessens was attracting and issued a
statement: the serum must not be given in Corsica either.
Any doctor breaking the ban would have their licence
revoked, they warned. Nevertheless, a prominent local
doctor, Henri Santonacci, announced he was prepared to
defy the authorities and administer the serum. On 30
December, The Daily Telegraph carried a photograph of
Edward being strapped into a helicopter to be flown from
Bastia to Ajaccio for his first shots [3] (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Maverik chemist Gaston Naessens in January 1964, waiting to board an aeroplane to take him from London to the continent. Reproduced, with permission, from
PA Photos.
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realised they would need to plan for an influx of enquiries
from families in a similar situation. ‘It would appear that
requests for treatment could well snowball’, warned the
Blackpool hospital committee and suggested that the Min-
istry ascertain the efficacy of the serum as soon as possible
to prevent a wave of desperate parents taking children
overseas [4].
It was not long before the enquires began, with
families writing to Snook, their Councillors, Members
of Parliament and the Ministry of Health. The situation
threatened to get out of hand. The Ministry, usually
determinedly silent on claimed cancer ‘cures’, realised
it had to act to prevent scores of families flying to Corsica
only to be denied treatment. The Daily Mail noted that
more than 100 British families had requested treatment
with Anablast, but Naessens only had enough serum towww.sciencedirect.comtreat his existing patients [5]. All this coverage, noted
New Scientist, had the effect of focusing the public gaze
on acute leukaemia, a ‘peculiarly tragic illness’ that
almost exclusively and rapidly struck down the young
[6].
Throughout January, letters continued to arrive at the
Ministry asking them to make the serummore available to
British families. Donald Brown, a young boy fromGlasgow,
flew to Corsica to be treated alongside Edward and five
French children; several other families were eager to join
them [7]. The parents of a girl from Orkney appealed to
their MP to seek advice from the Ministry, a family from
Stevenage persuaded their local council to write to
Anthony Barber (the Minister of Health) on behalf of their
daughter, and a boy from Liverpool was in danger of being
withdrawn from care at the Alder Hey Children’s Hospital
so as to begin treatment with Anablast [8]. The Ministry
Figure 2. Edward Burke being strapped into a helicopter on 30 December 1963. Reproduced, with permission, from the Daily Telegraph.
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ernment response.
On 6 January 1964, Naessens offered his serum to any
government willing to test it. Although the prestigious
Parisian Institut Gustav-Roussy took up the offer [9], they
warned that definitive results would not be available for up
to two years. The UK’s Ministry of Health continued to
receive demands that it perform the tests more quickly.
Eventually, owing to a fund set up by a Scottish business-
man, a team of Edinburgh scientists began to evaluate
Naessens’ serum and his methods. In the middle of Jan-
uary, a medical panel headed by the highly respected
Edinburgh radiotherapist Robert McWhirter convened
away from the press for two days [10]. They recommended
that the French trials would be sufficient, that the claimed
clinical results should be backed up by a controlled study
and that Naessens should publish his methods, obser-
vations and theories immediately. The Ministry of Health
made arrangements to relocate Naessens to Britain at
least temporarily, which would ensure a steadier supply
of Anablast for British families and coincidentally keep the
controversial chemist away from French media attention
while the authorities in his homeland investigated
whether there was sufficient material to bring a case
against him [11].
Quack remedy
Despite the Institut Gustav-Roussy’s projected timescale,
they released their preliminary findings within weeks:
Naessens’ work was riddled with errors; the serum was
useless. The microorganisms that Naessens claimed were
uniquely found in the blood of leukaemics were nothing of
the sort, Pierre Denoix reported to the French Minister of
Public Health. They were, in fact, fragments of red blood
cells known as myelinic figures that had already been
described, photographed and found to occur in the bloodwww.sciencedirect.comof both diseased and non-diseased patients. What is more,
microbes supposedly cultured from the blood of his patients
were found to be contaminants. Finally, all of those Naes-
sens claimed to have ‘cured’ using Anablast turned out to
have received conventional treatment as well, suggesting
his success stories were down to the delayed effects of
earlier therapy. Denoix’s damning conclusion was that
Naessens was peddling nonsense, a product that could
not possibly have any effect on leukaemia or, for that
matter, solid cancers [12]. The French authorities
responded quickly, issuing a statement that no doctor,
whether on mainland France or in Corsica, was to admin-
ister the serum.
In Britain, where emotive pleas continued to flood in
from the public, the Ministry of Health could not afford to
be so decisive. ‘I implore you to intervene to save my son’,
wrote Edward’s father in a telegram to Barber after the
French announcement. ‘[T]reatment must not be discon-
tinued at this vital stage otherwise all hope is gone’, he
wrote [13]. For Patrick Jenkins, the prospective Conserva-
tive candidate for Wanstead and Woodford, the serum was
nothing more than a ‘quack remedy’. ‘It does seem wicked
that an absolutely unqualified man like Naessens should
have aroused such wild hopes in desperate hearts’, he
wrote to Barber [14]. The Ministry could not afford to dash
such hopes but equally could not be seen to promote an
unproven treatment over the chemotherapy regimes then
available in the larger children’s hospitals. A Ministry
employee, writing in an internal memo, summed up the
dilemma: ‘[W]e are vulnerable either way, whether we
refuse or whether we allow this’ [15].
The solution was a compromise. On 28 January, Barber
released a memo stating that small quantities of Anablast
could be imported without hindrance for the treatment of
particular patients and that doctors would not be penalised
if they chose to administer it [16]. Edward’s mother Mary
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motherhood and asking for help protecting Naessens from
governmental attacks. Other families struggling to cope
with the slim chances for children with leukaemia made
similar appeals. In March, Naessens himself joined in,
appointing a lawyer to explore the legality of producing
the serum in the UK [17]. Staff in theMinistry, meanwhile,
sought to be as unhelpful as possible to Naessens, though
stopped short of blocking the use of Anablast. As onememo
put it, ‘we should keepM. Naessens out if we can; we do not
want a Corsica in East Kilbride’ [18].
By April, Edward’s plight had slipped out of the media
spotlight in favour of exciting findings coming from Amer-
ica: high doses of four drugs given in combination had
apparently cured four out of seventeen leukaemic children
given the experimental cocktail, reported the Daily
Express [19]. At last, the Ministry had its hands on some
concrete evidence that orthodox treatment for leukaemia,
which involved administering steroids, anti-metabolites
and other chemicals with proven anti-cancer effects, could
work. From here on, peddlers of alternative remedies
would prove easier to silence and to contain: the medical
profession had found a way to give real hope to families of
sick children.
Naessens only returned to the headlines in May the
following year, when a French court fined him for fraudu-
lent medical practice [20]. By this time, however, he had
emigrated to Canada, established a new laboratory and
started developing 714-X, a camphor-based treatment for
cancer and ‘other immunologically based diseases’ [21].
Once all hope of curing Edward Burke had vanished, the
boy was no longer of interest to the newspapers or of
concern to the Ministry of Health, whose files make no
mention of his death. Nevertheless, the response to the
coverage – the letters written to MPs, Ministries and
high-profile figures – suggests that the public felt their
government could be doing more for children in Edward’s
situation.
In fact, the British government had been investing
heavily in leukaemia research for a decade. In 1954, David
Hewitt of the Oxford Department of Social Medicine
prepared a report for the Medical Research CouncilFigure 3. The opening of the Leukaemia Research Unit in December 1961 at the Hospit
right as Middlesborough Councillor Mrs E Gaunt hands over a plaque to hospital staff on
with permission, from the Leukaemia Research Fund.
www.sciencedirect.com(MRC) on the changing incidence of serious disease in
the United Kingdom [22]. While heart disease and lung
cancer were both on the increase, childhood leukaemia was
responsible for the greatest increase in years of life lost.
Hewitt’s report prompted the MRC to reassess its funding
priorities and coordinate research into the causes of and
treatments for childhood leukaemia [23].
In 1959, theMRC launched its first clinical trials for this
disease, but this did not produce any good news about the
war on cancer: less than 10% of children diagnosedwith the
condition were receiving any chemotherapy and of those
that were none survived more than 12 months. Con-
sequently, the MRC decided to remain silent about this
initiative rather than reveal that government funds were
making no appreciable difference to survival and children
were being put through unnecessary suffering in their last
few months.
Charitable contributions
TheMRCwas not the only source of funds for research into
childhood cancer: the British Empire Cancer Campaign
(BECC) and the Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF)
were each also making grants to laboratories, furthering
work into the basic biology of cancer and testing possible
anti-cancer agents. But, with their funding priorities and
outlook similar to those of the MRC, these charities also
kept a low media profile. This was, partly, to avoid being
seen to favour particular clinicians or treatment centres
over others, but also because, like the MRC, they felt it ill-
advised to broadcast the slow progress in the fight to
conquer cancer.
This silence was shattered by the appearance of the
Leukaemia Research Fund. Following the loss of their
daughter to acute leukaemia in 1960, two parents founded
the charity in their home region of Teeside with designs on
establishing an office in London. At the end of 1961, the
charity used its first £5000 to establish a leukaemia
research unit at the Hospital for Sick Children in Great
Ormond Street, the first such facility in a children’s hospi-
tal in theUK [24] (Figure 3). They put out a press release to
celebrate the opening, a story that received near-blanket
coverage in the national press. On 7 December, foral for Sick Children in Great Ormond Street. Gordon Piller watches on from the far
behalf of representatives of the The Teeside Leukaemia Fund (centre). Reproduced,
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unit, welcoming this boost to the hospital’s long-standing
commitment for fighting childhood leukaemia [25].
The stories about this new charity unleashed a flood of
public enquiries to theMRC from relatives of children with
the disease and from members of the public wishing to
raise funds. Mothers, aunts and grandmothers of sick
children wanted to know how to contact the LRF, whether
the LRF’s unit was developing treatments not available
elsewhere, and why it had taken a charity to fund this
facility rather than the British government. Throughout
the mid-1960s, this last question continued to be asked in
daily broadsheets and in questions to parliament: was it
right that charitable funds should be needed to pay for
research into a major child killer?
Gordon Piller, the first and exceptionally long-standing
director of the LRF, was an experienced medical adminis-
trator and directed the charity away from the British
tradition of reporting only on laboratory research that
was being funded (Figure 3). Instead, he imported Amer-
ican models of press and public relations, writing press
releases for distribution across the country to capitalize on
every mention of childhood cancer. As stories emerged in
Uganda about Denis Burkitt’s work on a striking form of
endemic lymphoma and in the United States about the
progress of state-funded research teams seeking maxi-
mally effective combinations of chemotherapeutic agents,
Piller made sure the LRF had something to say and hope to
offer. His social entrepreneurship arguably changed the
tradition of charity fundraising initiatives across all the
medical fields.
In late March 1964, Piller wrote an article about the
state of leukaemia research, versions of which appeared in
several local newspapers [26]. ‘[C]onstant and exhaustive
research is being continued on a wide front’, he wrote in an
introductory paragraph to his article in the Sheffield Tele-
graph. ‘Some of that work is being done by the hon.
Secretary of the Leukaemia Research Fund Ltd.’
Piller went on to outline where research was taking
place and what it had revealed about the nature of the
disease, but also warned that though chemicals could
temporarily slow the progression of disease there was no
known treatment to which it did not become resistant. He
did not hold much faith in Anablast: ‘Claims of cures are
reported from time to time from all parts of the world.
These produce hope, but seldom add anything to what is
already known of this disease’, he wrote. His article closed
by suggesting that a sturdier form of hope, a grounded
hope, lay instead in supporting conventional research into
the disease: ‘a great deal of research is going on and will go
on until a cure is found. In the past 20 years our knowledge
has considerably advanced and everyone is nowwaiting for
a breakthrough’.
This bold optimism was not to the MRC’s liking. Such
statements had a tendency to elicit questions in the House
of Commons and letters from relatives of the sick about
when this breakthrough would come. Piller’s tendency to
promote his charity and its generosity also frustrated
MRC staff. In all Piller’s many articles, he naturally
described the work of his own unit first, but in a manner
whichMRC staff felt underplayed their contribution to thewww.sciencedirect.comfield: ‘The Leukaemia Research Fund, a national charity
for research into the disease, is supporting research at
Great Ormond Street Children’s Hospital, Derbyshire
Royal Infirmary and at Newcastle University. The
Medical Research Council is also supporting research of
various kinds as are some other charitable bodies’ [27]. In
contrast to the MRC and the larger cancer charities, the
LRF actively courted publicity. It did, after all, depend on
individuals’ donations, andmany of its keenest supporters
had lost child or adult relatives to leukaemiaandwished to
keep the disease in the public eye and on the government
agenda.
Then, in April 1964, a team at the US National Cancer
Institute’s clinical centre in Bethesda, Maryland
announced that they had developed a multi-drug regime
for acute leukaemia that seemed capable of killing every
leukaemic cell in a small proportion of their human
patients. The Lancet celebrated this breakthrough and
cancer specialists knew that chemotherapy had
the potential to cure acute leukaemia rather than just
leaving them in the limbo of remission. From then
onwards, those like Naessens seeking publicity for
unorthodox treatments found it harder to find sympath-
etic journalists.
Conclusion
News stories about children with cancer in the 1960s
capitalized on the vulnerability of the victims. The lack
of effective therapies, which had heartbreaking and finan-
cially ruinous consequences for those affected, made com-
pelling copy. The promise of unorthodox remedies like
Anablast raised hope and simultaneously cast doubt on
the ability of the medical establishment to produce results.
With national dailies appointing full-time correspondents
to cover science, technology and medicine for the first time
[28], medical innovations began to receive more column
inches as journalists attempted to unpick the economic,
moral and political implications of an increasing number of
dramatic new treatment options. The story of Edward
Burke proved opportunity too good to miss.
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